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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
and what the full impact of Britt and Mayer will be, of course, are still
only matters of speculation. Analysis of the decisions does indicate,
however, that indigent defendants are likely to face more opposition
than they have faced in the past to their requests for transcripts for
whatever purpose the transcripts are desired.
E. GRAHAM McGOOGAN, JR.
Criminal Procedure-Restricting Right to Counsel at Lineups
In Kirby v. Illinois,' the United States Supreme Court confronted
the problem of whether identification evidence is admissible when the
accused was exhibited to identifying witnesses in the absence of counsel
before he had been indicted or otherwise formally charged with a crimi-
nal offense. A sharply divided Court2 refused to extend the sixth amend-
ment guarantee of counsel3 to preindictment identification confronta-
tions. Thus Kirby considerably restricts the role of counsel in protection
of the pretrial rights of the accused.
A brief examination of the history of the right to counsel clause is
helpful in analyzing Kirby. Beginning with Powell v. Alabama,4 the
Supreme Court construed the sixth amendment guarantee to apply to
"critical stages" of proceedings against an accused.' In Powell, the
Court recognizes that the period from arraignment to trial was "perhaps
the most critical period of the proceedings." 6 Furthermore,in Hamilton
192 S. Ct. 1877 (1972).
2Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger, an-
nounced the judgment of the Court. Id. at 1879. Chief Justice Burger filed a concurring statement
on the basis that right to counsel attaches as soon as the accused is formally indicted. Id. at 1883,
Justice Powell filed a statement concurring in the result as he would not extend the Wade-Gilbert
per se exclusionary rule. Id. Justice White dissented on the basis that United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967), and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), compelled a reversal. Id. at 1980.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Douglas also dissented on the basis of Wade and
Gilbert. Id. at 1883.
3U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The guarantee states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
4287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932).
I[T]oday's law enforcement machinery involves critical confrontations of the ac-
cused by the prosecution at pretrial proceedings where the results might well settle the
accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality. In recognition of these
realities of modern criminal prosecution, our cases have construed the Sixth Amendment
guarantee to apply to "critical" stages of the proceedings.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967).
1287 U.S. at 57.
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v. Alabama the Court stated: "What happens [at arraignment] may
affect the whole trial. Available defenses may be irretrievably lost, if not
then and there asserted . . . . 7 This reasoning was subsequently ex-
panded when the Court held that a defendant's sixth amendment rights
were violated by the use in evidence of incriminating statements, deliber-
ately elicited from him by federal agents, after he had been indicted and
in the absence of his counsel.'
In Escobedo v. Illinois,' the United States Supreme Court extended
the right to counsel to an accused who had been secretly interrogated
before indictment despite his repeated requests to consult with his attor-
ney. The Court reasoned:
The rule sought by the State here, however, would make the trial
no more than an appeal from the interrogation; and the "right to use
counsel at the formal trial [would be] a very hollow thing [if], for all
practical purposes, the conviction is already assured by pretrial exami-
nation.". . . "One can imagine a cynical prosecutor saying: 'Let them
have the most illustrious counsel, now. They can't escape the noose.
There is nothing that counsel can do for them at the trial.' "10
Similarly, in Miranda v. Arizona," the right to counsel was applied to
custodial interrogations in order to protect the privilege against self-
incrimination.
On the basis of these precedents and the rationale underlying them,
the Supreme Court in United States v. Wade" and Gilbert v.
California3 held that a postindictment pretrial lineup is a critical stage
7368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961). Hamilton was arraigned without counsel for a capital offense; he
pleaded not guilty but was subsequently convicted and sentenced to death. The Court held that
the arraignment is a "critical stage" of the criminal proceedings, and absence of counsel at this
critical stage was a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
'Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
9378 U.S. 478 (1964). In Escobedo the Court found that the police investigation was no longer
a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but had begun to focus on a particular suspect. When
that suspect was denied his requests to consult with his attorney and was not warned of his
constitutional right to remain silent, he was denied the assistance of counsel in violation of the sixth
and fourteenth amendments; and no statements extracted by the police during the interrogation
could be used against him at a trial.
"Id. at 487-88.
1384 U.S. 436 (1966). While Escobedo and Miranda involved protection of the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination, those cases relied on the concept that the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel could be required to safeguard that privilege and other specific guarantees
of the Bill of Rights in order to provide a meaningful defense for the accused. See text accompany-
ing notes 51-52 infra.
12388 U.S. 218 (1967).
13388 U.S. 263 (1967).
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of the prosecution during which the accused is entitled to counsel. 4
Gilbert further held that any "in-court identifications" resulting from a
lineup which violated this constitutional standard were inadmissible
under a per se exclusionary rule. 15 Drawing principally upon the reason-
ing of Escobedo and Miranda, the Wade Court formulated the control-
ling principle for determining the necessity of counsel's presence at a
lineup or any other pretrial confrontation:
In sum, the principle of Powell v. Alabama and succeeding cases
requires that we scrutinize any pretrial confrontation of the accused
to determine whether the presence of his counsel is necessary to pre-
serve the defendant's basic right to a fair trial as affected by his right
meaningfully to cross-examine the witnesses against him and to have
effective assistance of counsel at the trial itself. It calls upon us to
analyze whether potential substantial prejudice to defendant's rights
inheres in the particular confrontation and the ability of counsel to
help avoid that prejudice.' 6
The Wade Court distinguished lineup proceedings from mere prep-
aratory stages in the gathering of evidence, 7 pointing out the "innumer-
able dangers and variables" riddling the lineup proceedings' The most
notable dangers cited were the well-known vagaries of eyewitness identi-
fication,19 the victim's possible vindictive motives"0 and the inherent
suggestion, whether intentional or unintentional in the manner in which
the prosecutor presents the suspect to the witness.2' The Court also
recognized that a victim is unlikely to retract a pretrial identification,
thus, in practical effect, determining the issue of identity before trial.22
As in Miranda,2 the Wade Court was concerned with the secrecy
surrounding the proceedings and the inability of the defense to "recon-
struct the manner and mode of lineup identification for judge or jury at
trial. 2 4 Almost certainly, defense counsel would be unable to expose
"Id. at 272.
01d. at 273.
"388 U.S. at 227 (emphasis by the Court).
"Id. at 227-28. Compare this finding with the Kirby plurality's characterization of the
"showup" as a part of a "routine police investigation." 92 S. Ct. at 1882.
1388 U.S. at 228.
"Id.
"Id. at 230.
1Id. at 229.
22d.
21"Privacy results in secrecy and this in turn results in a gap in our knowledge as to what in
fact goes on. ... 384 U.S. at 448.
21388 U.S. at 230.
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possible prejudicial factors, thus depriving the accused of meaningful
cross-examination of those present at the lineup.25 Applying the estab-
lished principle to these factors, the Wade Court concluded that the
postindictment pretrial lineup was no less a critical stage of the prosecu-
tion than the trial itself.L2
Wade and Gilbert were perhaps unexpected developments in the
pretrial rights of criminal defendants even though the years immediately
preceding those decisions had seen an expansion of those rights.27 "The
cases. . engendered numerous academic discussions, at times passion-
ate judicial reaction, Congressional legislation, and uncounted cases in
the state and federal courts. 28 In view of the numerous dangers which
were emphasized by the Wade Court, a number of commentators ex-
pected the lower courts to reject a preindictment-postindictment di-
chotomy when applying Wade and Gilbert.29 In the years following
Wade, the courts formulated a number of exceptions to a blanket impo-
sition of the right to counsel at identification confrontations;30 but, as
predicted, the overwhelming majority of those courts facing the issue
rejected the contention that Wade and Gilbert were to be limited only
3Id. at 230-32.
21Since it appears that there is grave potential for prejudice, intentional or not, in
the pretrial lineup, which may not be capable of reconstruction at trial, and since
presence of counsel itself can often avert prejudice and assure a meaningful confronta-
tion at trial, there can be little doubt that for Wade the post-indictment lineup was a
critical stage of the prosecution at which he was "as much entitled to such aid of counsel
. . . as at the trial itself."
Id. at 236-37 (footnote omitted).
"Rivers v. United States, 400 F.2d 935, 939 (1968) (footnotes omitted):
It is an understatement, of course, to say that the rights of a criminal defendant in pre-
trial proceedings have expanded greatly in just the last few years. But in no area of the
law was the development quicker, more startling, and perhaps more unexpected than
the recent decisions regarding the right to counsel during pre-trial out-of-court identifi-
cation procedures and confrontations between suspects and witnesses.
"Comment, The Right to Counsel at Lineups: Wade and Gilbert in the Lower Courts, 36 U.
CR1. L. Rav. 830-31 (1969) (footnotes omitted).
"See, e.g., Recent Developments, Constitutional Law-Criminal Procedure-Application of
Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel at Pretrial Identification Confrontations, 14 ViLL. L. REv.
535, 537 (1969) and materials cited at 537 n.12.
'See United State v. Ballard, 423 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1970) (right to counsel does not apply
to confrontations involving the use of photographs of the suspect); Russell v. United States, 408
F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 928 (1969) (right to counsel does not apply to on-
the-scene confrontations occurring shortly after the crime); People v. Cezarz, 44 II1. 2d 180, 255
N.E.2d 1 (1969) (right to counsel does not apply when suspect is not in custody); State v. Turner,
81 N.M. 571, 469 P.2d 720 (N.M. App. 1970) (right to counsel dos not apply to accidental
confrontations, i.e., those not deliberately arranged by the police).
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to postindictment confrontations." However, in Kirby v. Illinois,32 the
United States Supreme Court refused to apply Wade and Gilbert to a
preindictment identification confrontation.
Petitioner Kirby and a companion, Ralph Bean, were stopped on
a Chicago street by two police officers on February 22, 1968.11 When
asked for identification, Kirby produced a wallet containing traveler's
checks and a Social Security card, all bearing the name of Willie Shard.
Kirby and Bean were arrested and taken to the police station, where the
arresting officers learned from police records that one Willie Shard had
been robbed February 20, 1968. A police car was dispatched to bring
Shard to the station, where he identified Kirby and Bean at a
"showup"34 as his assailants. No attorney was present; Kirby and Bean
had not asked for counsel nor had they been advised of any such right.
Six weeks later, Kirby and Bean were indicted for the robbery and, upon
arraignment, counsel was appointed. A pretrial motion to suppress
Shard's identification testimony was denied. During his testimony,
3
'Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Missouri, and Virginia have rejected the application of the right
to counsel to preindictment cases. State v. Fields, 104 Ariz. 486, 455 P.2d 964 (1969); Perkins v.
State, 228 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 1969) (per curiam); People v. Palmer, 41 111. 2d 571, 244 N.E.2d 173
(1969); State v. Crossman, 464 S.W.2d 36 (Mo. 1971); State v. Waters, 457 S.W.2d 817 (Mo.
1970); Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 664, 173 S.E.2d 792 (1970).
Thirteen states have applied Wade and Gilbert to preindictment confrontations. People v.
Fowler, I Cal. 3d 335, 461 P.2d 643, 82 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1969); State v. Singleton, 253 La. 18, 215
So. 2d 838 (1968); Palmer v. State, 5 Md. App. 691, 249 A.2d 482 (1969); Commonwealth v.
Guillory, 356 Mass. 591, 254 N.E.2d 427 (1970); People v. Hutton, 21 Mich. App. 312, 175 N.W.2d
860 (1970); Thompson v. State, 85 Nev. 134,451 P.2d 704, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 893 (1969); State
v. Wright, 274 N.C. 84, 161 S.E.2d 581 (1968); State v. Isaacs, 24 Ohio App. 2d 115, 265 N.E.2d
327 (1970); Commonwealth v. Whiting, 439 Pa. 205, 266 A.2d 738 (1970); In re Holley,-R.I.-,
268 A.2d 723 (1970); Martinez v. State, 437 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969); State v. Hicks,
76 Wash. 2d 80, 455 P.2d 943 (1969); Hayes v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 93, 175 N.W.2d 625 (1970).
Every United States Court of Appeals confronting the issue has applied Wade and Gilbert to
preindictment confrontations. Wilson v. Gaffney, 454 F.2d 142 (10th Cir. 1972); Virgin Islands v.
Callwood, 440 F.2d 1206 (3rd Cir. 1971); United States v. Greene, 429 F.2d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Cooper v. Picard, 428 F.2d 1351 (Ist Cir. 1970); United States v. Phillips, 427 F.2d 1035 (9th Cir.
1970); United States v. Ayers, 426 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Broadhead, 413 ,F.2d
1351 (7th Cir. 1969); Rivers v. United States, 400 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1968).
3292 S. Ct. 1877 (1972).
"Petitioner and Bean were stopped because the police officers thought petitioner fit the
description of a man named "Hampton" wanted for an unrelated criminal offense. Id. at 1879 n.l.
"Petitioner and Bean, who were black (Brief for Petitioner at 5), were seated at a desk
between two white police officers in uniform when Shard entered the room. Shard had been asked
previously by the officer who brought him to the station if he had been robbed and if he could
make an identification. He answered affirmatively. When he entered the room Shard saw the two
defendants seated at the desk, and he pointed them out as his assailants. All of this took place
several hours after the arrest. Id. at 1883 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Shard described his identification of the two men at the police station
and identified them again in the courtroom. Both defendants were found
guilty and Kirby's conviction was affirmed on appeal. 5 In holding that
Shard's testimony was admissible, the Illinois Court of Appeals relied
upon an earlier decision of the Illinois Supreme Court, People v.
Palmer,6 which held that the Wade-Gilbert per se exclusionary rule
was not applicable to preindictment confrontations.
In affirming the decision of the Illinois Court of Appeals, the
United States Supreme Court reviewed the line of cases stemming from
Powell v. Alabama.37 From these cases, the plurality drew the rule that
"a person's Sixth and Fourteenth amendment right to counsel attaches
only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been
initiated against him."38 Although they recognized that the defendant's
right to counsel is not limited to assistance at trial,39 the plurality
pointed out that the cases reviewed "involved points of time at or after
the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings."4 Escobedo
and Miranda were distinguished as cases primarily protecting the privi-
lege against self-incrimination, not the right to counsel as such.4
According to the plurality, adversary judicial criminal proceedings
are initiated "by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment,
information, or arraignment. ' 42 Only upon the initiation of such crimi-
nal proceedings does the government become an adversary committed
to prosecute. Not until then is the defendant "faced with the prosecu-
torial forces of organized. society, and immersed in the intricacies of
substantive and procedural criminal law." 43 The plurality emphasized
-"People v. Kirby, 121 Ill. App. 2d 323, 257 N.E.2d 589 (1970). Bean's conviction was
reversed. People v. Bean, 121 II1. App., 2d 332, 257 N.E.2d 562 (1970).
-41 Ill. 2d 571, 244 N.E.2d 173 (1969).
-287 U.S. 45 (1932).
3sKirby v. Illinois, 92 S. Ct. 1877, 1881 (1972).
'"[D]uring perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings against these defen-
dants, that is to say, from the time of their arraignment until the beginning of their trial,
when consultation, thorough-going investigation and preparation were vitally important,
the defendants did not have the aid of counsel in any real sense, although they were as
much entitled to such aid during that period as at the trial itself."
Id. at 1882 n.6, quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932).
4092 S. Ct. at 1882.
1
'"[T]he 'prime purpose' of Escobedo was not to vindicate the constitutional right to counsel
as such, but, like Miranda, 'to guarantee full effectuation of the privilege against self-
incrimination.'" Id.
421d.
431d
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that the situation in Kirby was only "a routine police investigation"
until the commencement of the "'criminal prosecutions' to which alone
the explicit guarantees of the Sixth Amendment are applicable.""
In reaching the decision in Kirby, the plurality asserted that they
declined to depart from the rationale of Wade and Gilbert that "an
accused is entitled to counsel at any 'critical stage of the prosecution,'
and that a postindictment lineup is such a 'critical stage.' "Is Yet, as
noted above," a great majority of the lower courts found the reasoning
of Wade equally applicable to preindictment identification confronta-
tions." A number of the opinions point out that the real concern of the
Wade Court was the danger of suggestiveness and the difficulty in re-
creating the facts of the confrontation at trial which would hamper
effective cross-examination." Particularly instructive are the statements
of the Tenth Circuit in Wilson v. Gaffney:"
Although the many potential ramifications of the Wade-Gilbert
rule remain to be judicially explored we consider it certain that the
rationale of the cases extends beyond the particular facts of those cases
... . [S]urely the assistance of counsel, now established as an abso-
lute post-indictment right does not arise or attach because of the return
of an indictment. The confrontation of a lineup, said to be "peculiarly
riddled with innumerable dangers and variable factors which might
seriously, even crucially, derogate from a fair trial," cannot have a
constitutional distinction based upon the lodging of a formal charge.
Every reason set forth by the Supreme Court in Wade . . . for the
assistance of counsel post-indictment has equal or more impact when
projected against a pre-indictment atmosphere.
The Kirby plurality's attempt to distinguish Escobedo and Miranda
as cases primarily protecting the fifth amendment privilege against com-
pulsory self-incrimination is also difficult to reconcile with the reasoning
"Id.
11d. at 1883 (emphasis by the Court).
"See note 31 supra.
"
7See, e.g., Long v. United States, 424 F.2d 799, 802 (D.C. Cir. 1969): "Although Wade arose
in the context of a formal post-indictment line-up, we find its requirement of counsel equally
applicable to the informal, pre-arrest confrontation of appellant which took place in the squad
room."
1s"We characterized in Long the Supreme Court's rationale in Wade to be that of the difficulty
attendant upon accurately reconstructing the exact circumstances of the pretrial confrontation and
the useful role which counsel can play not only in that process but in suggesting procedures which
might render the confrontation legally unassailable thereafter." United States v. Greene, 429 F.2d
193, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
"454 F.2d 142, 144 (10th Cir. 1972) (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 51
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of Wade. In Rivers v. United States, 0 the Fifth Circuit asserted that
"with Miranda on the books, it is indisputable that most, perhaps all,
confrontations occurring after arrest will fall within the rules announced
in Wade and Gilbert." The Wade Court recognized that "nothing de-
cided or said in the opinions in the cited cases links the right to counsel
only to protection of Fifth Amendment rights."'51 Instead, Wade de-
clared, Escobedo and Miranda reaffirmed the principle "that in addition
to counsel's presence at trial, the accused is guaranteed that he need not
stand alone against the State at any stage of the prosecution, formal or
informal, in court or out, where counsel's absence might derogate from
the accused's right to a fair trial. '5 2
The questionable logic of the plurality opinion in Kirby is further
underscored when one analyzes the particular confrontation involved. 3
A showup has been described as "the most grossly suggestive identifica-
tion procedure now or ever used by the police,"54 yet the identification
confrontation in Kirby was characterized as no more than part of a
routine police investigation.
It should be logically apparent that those factors which make a
pretrial lineup a critical stage of the prosecution exist at a preindictment
as well as a postindictment identification confrontation. "5 The investiga-
tion in Kirby already had focused upon particular suspects in the cus-
tody of the police. The circumstances surrounding the confrontaton
would seem to indicate to the witness that the police believed that Kirby
and Bean were the guilty parties. Had counsel been present, he could
have at least requested that Kirby and Bean be exhibited to the witness
in an identification parade where the witness would have been required
to identify each man individually." As it was, the issue of identity was
"400 F.2d 935, 939 (5th Cir. 1968).
"388 U.S. at 226.
52Id.
0For a description of the identification confrontation in Kirby see note 34 supra. "In the
setting of a police station squad room where all present except petitioner and Bean were police
officers, the danger was quite real that Shard's understandable resentment might lead him too
readily to agree with the police that the pair under arrest, and the only persons exhibited to him,
were indeed the robbers." 92 S. Ct. at 1887 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
5"p. WALL, EYE-WvITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 28 (1965).
"In Escobedo v. Illinois, 378U.S. 478 (1964), the State argued that Escobedo had no right to
call his attorney prior to an in-custody interrogation since he was not formally indicted. The Court
stated: "It would exalt form over substance to make the right to counsel, under these circumstan-
ces, depend on whether at the time of the interrogation, the authorities had secured a formal
indictment." Id. at 486.
""The practice of showing suspects singly to persons for the purpose of identification, and
not as part of a lineup, has been widely condemned." Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967).
1973]
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determined before trial"7 without counsel's protective presence. 8
The Wade Court attempted to assure a meaningful defense for the
accused.51 In contrast, the plurality in Kirby emphasized "the interest
of society in the prompt and purposeful investigation of an unsolved
crime. '"" By limiting the right to counsel to postindictment confronta-
tons, the Kirby holding may considerably dampen further expansion of
the protection by counsel of the criminal defendant's pretrial rights.
Protection of those rights is now, for the most part, dependent on the
guarantees of procedural due process embodied in the fifth and four-
teenth amendments.61 It would seem that the role of counsel, before the
initiation of formal judicial proceedings, is to be limited to the
Escobedo-Miranda situations where the privilege against self-
incrimination is endangered."2 More importantly, the rationale underly-
57On direct examination, Shard identified Kirby and Bean as the pair he saw in the police
station squad room, not as the alleged robbers on trial in the courtroom. 92 S. Ct. at 1888
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
uSome commentators have argued that counsel may serve no significant purpose at a lineup
other than that of a witness or observer; that the police, and not counsel, are in charge of the
identification procedure. See Read, Lawyers at Lineups: Constitutional Necessity or Avoidable
Extravagance?, 17 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 339 (1969); Note, Right to Counsel at Pre-trial Lineup, 63
Nw. U.L. REv. 251 (1968); Note, Lawyers and Lineups, 77 YALE L.J. 390 (1967).
However, one can argue that there is no reason to assume that the police will be uncooperative
with counsel and ignore his suggestions as a general rule. His role and effectiveness may not be so
limited as some commentators suggest. See, e.g., Recent Developments, 14 VILL. L. REV., supra
note 29, at 541:
[H]is presence at the initial confrontation between the witness and the suspect does
afford him a greater capacity to effectively cross-examine the identifying witnesses at
trial. Since in-court identifications are normally the highpoint of a criminal trial, any
information obtained at a pretrial confrontati6n which can be used to shake the credibil-
ity of an identifying witness is invaluable to the defense. Moreover, if the suspect was
unaware of the unfairness of the initial identification procedure, or chooses not to testify
because of a prior criminal record, counsel is available to testify in his behalf.
519"The plain wording of this guarantee thus encompasses counsel's assistance whenever neces-
sary to assure a meaningful 'defence.'" 388 U.S. at 224-25.
'192 S. Ct. at 1883.
"What has been said is not to suggest that there may not be occasions during the
course of a criminal investigation when the police do abuse identification procedures.
Such abuses are not beyond the reach of the Constitution. ... The Due Process Clause
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments forbids a lineup that is unnecessarily sugges-
tive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification.
Id.
Whether or not there was a deprivation of due process in the particular circumstances of Kirby
was not considered in view of the limited grant of certiorari. That question was left open for inquiry
in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Id. at 1883 n.8.
"Both Kirby and Wade held that the constitutional privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination was in no way implicated in the particular identification proceedings before the
Court. Id. at 1881.
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ing Escobedo and Miranda was not afforded even a cursory examination
by the plurality. Yet, Wade specifically relied upon those decisions in
establishing the controlling constitutional principle63 for the applicabil-
ity of the sixth amendment guarantee of the right to counsel at pretrial
confrontations. 4 Apparently that guiding principle has now been re-
jected. In its place, Kirby has established an illogical, inflexible formula
based on a preindictment-postindictment dichotomy, a formula severely
limiting counsel's role in pretrial proceedings in the future.
MICHAEL E. KELLY
Federal Jurisdiction-Citizenship of the Beneficiary Controls in Wrong-
ful Death Actions Requiring a Resident Administrator
Administrators have traditionally been viewed as the real party in
interest whose citizenship is determinative in diversity jurisdiction. In a
recent wrongful death action, Miller v. Perry,1 the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit sustained the validity of state statutes requiring such
actions to be brought by a resident administrator, but held that the
citizenship of the beneficiaries controls diversity.
In Miller, a minor citizen of Florida had died in North Carolina,
allegedly through the negligence of the Perrys, North Carolina citizens.
Since the minor died intestate, his father was appointed administrator
of his estate in Florida. Mr. Miller subsequently brought an action in
his representative capacity against the Perrys in a federal district court
in North Carolina under the state's wrongful death act.2 This action was
dismissed because North Carolina law requires in-state assets to be
administered by a resident administrator.3 The state supreme court had
previously held that a wrongful death action was an asset of the de-
ceased in the county where the death occurred.4 The decedent's grand-
father, a resident of North Carolina, was then appointed ancillary ad-
ministrator, and a second action was brought by him in the district court
"See text accompanying note 16 supra.
61492 S. Ct. at 1884 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1456 F.2d 63 (4th Cir. 1972).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173 (1966). For the provision itself, see note 34 infra.
3N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-8 (1966) provides in pertinent part: "The clerk shall not issue letters
of administration or letters testamentary to any person who, at the time of appearing to qual-
ify-. . . (2) Is a nonresident of this State; but a nonresident may qualify as executor."
'Vance v. Southern Ry., 138 N.C. 460, 50 S.E. 860 (1905).
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